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BETWEEN NORMS AND FACTS: 
 THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT'S COMMITMENT TO PLURALISM  
IN SOUTH AFRICA'S RADICALLY HETEROGENEOUS PUBLIC SCHOOLS  
S Woolman 
The concept of practical reason as a subjective capacity is of modern vintage. 
Converting the Aristotelian conceptual framework … had the advantage … of relating 
practical reason to the "private" happiness and "moral" autonomy of the individual. 
[P]ractical reason was thenceforth related to the freedom of the human being as 
private subject who could assume the roles of member of civil society and citizen, 
both national and global. … Hegel remained convinced, just like Aristotle, that society 
finds its unity in the political life and organisation of the state. … However, modern 
societies have since become so complex that these two conceptual motifs – that of a 
society concentrated in the state and that of society made up of individuals – can no 
longer be applied unproblematically. … [I]n the Marxist concept of a democratically 
self-governing society … both the bureaucratic state and the capitalist economy were 
[largely] supposed to disappear. Systems theory erases even these traces. The state 
forms just one subsystem alongside other functionally specified social subsystems. 2… 
The development of constitutional democracy along the celebrated 'North Atlantic' 
path has certainly provided us with results worth preserving, but once those who do 
not have the good fortune to be the heirs of the Founding Fathers turn to their own 
traditions, they cannot find criteria and reasons that would allow them to distinguish 
what would be worth preserving from what should be rejected.  
1. Introduction 
Law is a terribly derivative discipline. That proposition shouldn't surprise most 
readers. Law serves many masters: economics (privilege and class structures); 
politics (maintaining and disrupting the status quo); epistemology (belief in cold, 
hard facts or subjectivism); religion (for some, as its prior, moral underpinning; for 
others, a sacred domain that ought to remain distinct from the profane); language 
and culture (the contention that a nation must reflect the traditions of a relatively 
homogeneous volk), and even metaphysics (some who believe that all persons are 
causally free to do as they wish, and others who contend that the various 
communities into which we are born largely determine how we go about pursuing a 
life worth valuing.) Oh, and let me not forget the social contract tradition that 
stretches from Locke to Rawls to our own Constitution: that the law secures its 
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legitimacy only through the consent of the governed. It should come as little surprise 
that the relatively small cluster of education-related decisions handed down by our 
Constitutional Court serve these many masters. But, as we pull back and view the 
jurisprudence in Habermasian terms, one dominant theme jumps out: pluralism. 
Habermas identifies pluralism as the central problem for most of the post-1990 
constitutional democracies that arose out of authoritarian regimes. The disjunction 
between the lofty norms articulated in our basic law and the panoply of South 
African ethical, cultural, linguistic and cultural traditions is especially picante in the 
field of education law and policy.  
Put slightly differently, we are engaged in what Habermas believes to be the most 
challenging of projects – the unification of multiple legal, moral, ethical, cultural, 
social, moral and political traditions, in a highly stratified economy with the highest 
Gini coefficient in the world, with little history of trust between peoples from 
dramatically different communities, under the banner of a single state fashioned in 
terms of a basic law to which all other norms or forms of law are, putatively, 
subsidiary. That's a really big ask.1 It therefore seems worth acknowledging (a) that 
20 years constitutes a mere blip in time; (b) that the stitching together of multiple 
societies (whose individual members (i) speak at least one of the 11 official 
                                                          
1  See Judt 'Is there a Belgium?' (December 1999) The New York Review of Books 10. Belgium has 
10 million inhabitants, and enjoys the honour of being host to the legislative, regulatory and 
administrative apparatus of the European Union. Yet it doesn't operate in a manner that we would 
associate with a modern European state. It's not simply that the Dutch-speaking Flemings and the 
French-speaking Walloons have never mastered the fine art of bi-cultural cohabitation. (They are now 
split into two unilingual units.) Judt's account reveals how each little town, or tourist destination, or 
metropolis functions rather autonomously through archaic patrimonial 'pillars' dispersed into five 
regions in Flanders and five regions in Wallonia. Local power arrangements embedded in distinct 
unilingual regions makes meaningful national coordination difficult and governance fundamentally 
corrupt and undemocratic. Belgium looks more like a loose affiliation of postal codes, than the country 
that inspired Conrad's Heart of Darkness. As Judt observes:'Belgium has much to commend it beyond 
the self-deprecatingly touted virtues of beer and waffles; but its most salient quality today may be the 
illustration that this country can furnish of the perils now facing states everywhere.' Id. Also see Judt 
Postwar: A history of Europe since 1945 (2005). Belgium seemingly lacks the capacity to address 
urgent systemic challenges through collective action. Judt thus partially reverses the spin of 
Habermas' observation regarding new democracies. He tenders an Orwellian sense of how established 
democracies can corrode quite quickly into divisively distinct and dangerous cantons. See further Judt 
'On intellectuals and democracy'(May 2012) The New York Review of Books 5 ('They corrode because 
most people don't care very much about them … The difficulty of sustaining voluntary interest in the 
business of choosing the people who will rule over you is well attested.') By 2012, Judt had further 
evidence that political parties had the capacity to render modern multiparty democracies 
ungovernable to the point of failure or collapse. See Plattner 'Is democracy in decline?' (2015) 26 
Journal of Democracy 1, 8-10. 
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languages, and (ii) operate on a daily basis according to far more numerous and 
complex visions of the good) requires a significant amount of heavy lifting, and (c) 
that the basic law, even with all the laws and judgments designed to give it effect, 
cannot rectify all the wrongs of the past nor provide all the material and immaterial 
goods learners require in order to pursue lives worth valuing.  
But this article does not focus on the degree to which our nascent democracy has 
succeeded or failed to meet the lofty aspirations of our Constitution.  It has a far 
more narrow focus.  It suggests, and hopefully shows, that the Constitutional Court 
has achieved something rather remarkable in its education jurisprudence. In 
addressing concerns about what constitutions in non-North Atlantic democracies can 
do, it has crafted a body of law that recognises the plurality of traditions to which our 
education law must speak.  In so doing, it has identified a golden thread that ties all 
of its education judgments together: a commitment to pluralism that opens all school 
doors to all learners and attempts to start us down the long, arduous path of learning 
to live with one another.   
This article takes the following form.  Section 2 sets out the relevant extant 
constitutional doctrine on learners' rights.  Section 3 reveals the delicate doctrinal 
thread of pluralism that runs through the Constitutional Court's judgments and 
assesses the manner in which it has transformed, quite modestly, the nature of 
tuition in our heterogeneous classrooms.   
2. Learners' rights and doctrinal analysis 
2.1  "On your own dime": The difference between maintaining cultures, 
languages and religions in public schools as against private schools  
Section 29(3) of the Constitution permits linguistically and culturally restrictive 
admissions policies at independent schools so long as these policies do not discriminate, 
intentionally, upon the basis of race. The Constitutional Court, in Gauteng School 
Education Bill, made it quite clear that comprehensive visions of the good are more 
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appropriately accommodated in private schools and not in our public schools.2  As 
Kriegler J notes in Gauteng School Education Bill, s 32(c) of the Interim Constitution 
(now s 29(3) of the Constitution) and then extant national and provincial education 
legislation collectively constitute 
a bulwark against the swamping of any minority's common culture, language or 
religion. For as long as a minority actually guards its common heritage, for so long 
will it be its inalienable right to establish educational institutions for the preservation 
of its culture, language or religion … There are, however, two important 
qualifications. Firstly … there must be no discrimination on the ground of race … The 
Constitution protects diversity, not racial discrimination. Secondly… [the 
Constitution] … keeps the door open for those for whom the State's educational 
institutions are considered inadequate as far as common culture, language or 
religion is concerned. They are at liberty harmoniously to preserve the heritage of 
their fathers for their children. But there is a price, namely that such a population 
group will have to dig into its own pocket.3 
While sympathetic to the belief that communities bound by common culture, language 
or religion are an important source of meaning for most South Africans, Justice Kriegler 
makes it clear that the post-apartheid state can no longer support public institutions 
that privilege one way of being in the world over another.  The Constitution's answer to 
those parents who wish to school their children in the language, culture or religion of 
their choice is pretty straightforward: you may "dig into your own pocket" and build the 
"independent school" on your own time.4  
2.2 'Spare the Rod': Discipline in faith-based Independent Schools 
In Christian Education South Africa v Minister of Education, the Constitutional Court was 
seized with the question as to whether or not corporal punishment in a private faith-
based school could be used as a method of discipline.5  S v Williams had held that 
                                                          
2  See Ex parte Gauteng Provincial Legislature: In Re Dispute Concerning the Constitutionality of 
Certain Provisions of the Gauteng School Education Bill of 1995 1996 3 SA 165 (CC), 1996 4 BCLR 
537 (CC) (Justice Sachs argues that the religious, linguistic and cultural rights found in the Interim 
Constitution are best understood as efforts to "concretise … a certain measure of cultural/linguistic 
autonomy in the private sphere. … Section 32(c) appears… to be an explicit, if limited, 
acknowledgement of the need in certain circumstances to allow for a departure from the general 
principles of [non-discrimination] … What appears to be provided for … is not a duty on the State to 
support discrimination, but a right of people … to further their own distinctive interests.") 
3  Id paras 39–42.  Also see Woolman & Fleisch The Constitution in the Classroom: Education and the 
Law in South Africa, 1994 – 2008 (2009). 
4  Woolman "Defending discrimination: On the constitutionality of independent schools that promote a 
partial, if not a comprehensive, vision of the good" (2007) Stellenbosch Law Review 31.  
5  2000 4 SA 757 (CC), 2000 10 BCLR 1051 (CC). 
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court-imposed whipping impairs the right to dignity of minors.6  The Christian Education 
Court extended the line of reasoning in Williams and held that although the applicants 
had correctly averred that the prevention of corporal punishment in faith-based 
independent schools was a prima facie infringement of their rights to religious freedom 
(s 15) and religious practice (s 31), the infringements were both reasonable and 
justifiable.   
The judgment contains valuable language about how our equality jurisprudence 
tolerates legal and cultural asymmetries. The essence of equality under the South 
African Constitution, so says the judgment, is that it does not require that we treat 
everyone the same way, but that we treat everyone with equal concern and respect.7 
And that's just a fancy way of saying that we need not all act the same way in order to 
enjoy the benefits — ie, religious, cultural, ethnic and associational — vouchsafed by a 
liberal constitution. 
The Christian Education Court, however, does not extend the benefit of this 
understanding of equality to the use of corporal punishment in religious or faith-based 
independent schools.  A commitment to pluralism does mean that "anything goes". The 
judgment assumes that for the purposes of analysing the constitutionality of s 10 of the 
South African Schools Act8 — which bars the use of corporal punishment by teachers — 
ss 15 and 31 of the Constitution have been infringed. Upon moving to the limitations 
analysis under s 36, the Christian Education Court explains why the state is justified in 
barring corporal punishment in religious independents schools and why the court will 
not craft an exemption for such punishment. 
Some readers might view this outcome as inconsistent with overcoming the 
Habermasian problem.  That conclusion would be far too hasty.  In our new pluralist 
order, it is perfectly reasonable to override religious dictates and to bar the corporal 
punishment of children in schools of any kind. First, corporal punishment impairs a 
child's right to dignity in terms of s 10 of the Constitution. Second, it reflects an invasion 
of bodily integrity in terms of the right to freedom and security of the person in terms of 
                                                          
6  1995 3 SA 632(CC), 1995 7 BCLR (CC).  
7  Id para 42. 
8  Act 84 of 1996. 
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s 12 of the Constitution. Third, by allowing teachers (known personally to students) to 
mete out punishment, it manifestly breaches a child's right in terms of s 28(1)(d) of the 
Constitution "to be protected from maltreatment, neglect, abuse or degradation". 
Finally, children are in no position to determine the desirability of a set of religious 
practices that may result in harm to themselves.  
A constitutional commitment to pluralism only requires that we take other "ways of 
being in the world" seriously.9  An appreciation of our differences – raised by Justice 
Sachs to the level of a constitutional value – could not possibly entitle us to do whatever 
we like. That connotation would invite chaos: and that's what any system of law, by 
definition, is designed to prevent.  In addition, rights often conflict with one another.  As 
citizens, or as petitioners before a court, or as judges, we must first discern what our 
Constitution requires of us and then, secondly, decide which religious, cultural, ethnic, 
traditional or social practices are consistent with those requirements, and which must 
go.  (But let's recall our Habermasian insight: given our radical heterogeneity, we will 
not always possess an uncontroversial explanation for what the Constitution requires of 
us.)  If a problem exists with the Christian Education Court's distinction, then it turns on 
the Court's distinction between the practice of religion in schools and the practice of 
religion elsewhere, i.e., the home. If children lack the capacity to decide for themselves 
whether or not religious practices will prove deleterious to their health — and it 
therefore becomes incumbent upon the state to intervene on their behalf — then it 
would seem reasonable to conclude that barring religion-sanctioned corporal 
punishment at home should be no different from barring religion-sanctioned corporal 
punishment at school. But that is not what the Court concludes. Instead, it inclines 
toward the proposition that parents "were not being obliged to make an absolute and 
strenuous choice between obeying a law of the land or following their conscience. They 
could do both simultaneously."10 Parents can follow their conscience at home. However, 
they must still obey the law of the land by having their children attend school free from 
corporal punishment. Can the Christian Education Court have it both ways? At first 
blush, it would appear that either (a) the scope for religious autonomy and the religious 
                                                          
9  Prince v President, Cape Law Society 2002 2 SA 794 (CC), 2002 1 SACR 431 (CC), 2002 3 BCLR 231 
(CC). 
10  Christian Education (n 5) para 51.  
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community's constitutive attachments is sufficient to justify corporal punishment in 
school and at home, or (b) a child's right to dignity is of such paramount importance for 
the state to bar it when deployed at school or at home.11   
The legislature has provided a fairly definitive answer to the Christian Education Court's 
conundrum.  The Children's Act, s 12, promulgated in 2005, states that "every child has 
the right not to be subjected to social, cultural or religious practices which are 
detrimental to his or her well-being."12   
                                                          
11  Woolman and Bishop "Education" in Woolman & Bishop (eds) Constitutional law of South Africa (2nd 
Edition, 2008) Chapter 58. 
12  Act 38 of 2005.  Hard cases elicit different responses from our highest court.  In Prince, Justice 
Sachs articulates his initial understanding of a "right to be different". In demanding that his 
colleagues, the state and his fellow citizens "walk the extra mile" when it comes to marginal 
subpublics, Sachs writes: "Intolerance may come in many forms. At its most spectacular and 
destructive it involves the use of power to crush beliefs and practices considered alien and 
threatening. At its more benign it may operate through a set of rigid mainstream norms which do not 
permit the possibility of alternative forms of conduct." Prince v President, Cape Law Society 2002 2 
SA 794 (CC), 2002 1 SACR 431 (CC), 2002 3 BCLR 231 (CC) para 145 (Court holds that the 
Rastafarian use of cannabis in religious rituals is justifiably impaired by criminal sanctions because 
the legislature has the power prohibit conduct it considers to be anti-social.) Sachs comes close to 
accusing his of being in the grip of a blinkered hypocrisy. He writes: "In Christian Education, this 
Court held that a number of provisions in the Constitution affirmed the right of people to be who 
they [are] without being forced to subordinate themselves to the cultural and religious norms of 
others, and highlighted the importance of individuals and communities being able to enjoy what has 
been called the 'right to be different'. In each case, space [had] been found for members of 
communities [in our democracy] to depart from a general norm." Id paras 170–172. Democracy in a 
society of radically heterogeneous communities, Sachs argues, presupposes the capability of 
marginalised and vulnerable minorities to challenge the normative closure into which political 
communities tend to lapse. A society can remain free only if it values plurality, and allows out-groups 
to challenge deeply held majoritarian beliefs and practices. For this reason, the critical challenge for 
our constitutional "democracy" consists "not in accepting what is familiar and easily accommodated, 
but in giving reasonable space to what is 'unusual, bizarre or even threatening'". Id para 71. In Bhe, 
another dissent challenges the flattening of our diverse subpublics in the name of core constitutional 
values. In Bhe v Magistrate, Khayelitsha 2005 1 SA 580 (CC), 2005 1 BCLR 1 (CC). Justice Ngcobo 
writes:  
 Ours is not the only country that has a pluralist legal system in the sense of common, statutory and 
indigenous law. Other African countries that face the same problem have opted not for replacing 
indigenous law with common law or statutory laws. Instead, they have accepted that indigenous law 
is part of their laws and have sought to regulate the circumstances where it is applicable. In my view 
this approach reflects recognition of the constitutional right of those communities that live by and are 
governed by indigenous law. … It is a recognition of our diversity, which is an important feature of 
our constitutional democracy. [I]n accommodating different systems of law in order to ensure that 
the most vulnerable are treated fairly … [t]he choice of law mechanism must be informed by the 
need to: (a) respect the right of communities to observe cultures and customs which they hold dear; 
(b) preserve indigenous law subject to the Constitution; and (c) protect vulnerable members of the 
family. Id  paras 235–238.  
 The Fourie Court captures much of what is at stake in matters in which traditional forms of private 
ordering and the novel social formations apparently required by our basic law are at odds:  
 A democratic, universalistic, caring and aspirationally egalitarian society embraces everyone and 
accepts people for who they are. At the very least, it affirms that difference should not be the basis 
for exclusion, marginalisation and stigma. … The acknowledgment and acceptance of difference is 
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Whether or not a child receives an education at a religiously-inflected public school, a 
faith-based independent school, or at home according to religious dictates, the best 
interests of the child remain paramount and preclude the use of corporal punishment to 
maintain order.  If, however, we wish to recognise Christian Education as a victory for 
pluralism, then a more charitable reading must be offered.  Having previously addressed 
corporal punishment in public schools in Williams, the Christian Education Court extends 
its reasoning to corporal punishment in private schools. Whether home-schooling would 
be subject to the same dictates and a comparable outcome was not placed before the 
Court.  Courts – especially apex courts – must do more than simply adjudicate one case 
at a time.13  But we should not expect such courts to provide a theory of everything in 
every decision.  The trajectory of the Christian Education Court's reasoning is clear 
enough.  Moreover, should they ever be asked to engage discipline and home-
schooling, their own judgments, the countervailing rights in the Constitution and 
Children's Act provide a relatively clear answer as to what the Court would and should 
decide when the Court is seized with such a matter.   
453 
  
                                                                                                                                                                                     
particularly important in our country where for centuries group membership based on supposed 
biological characteristics such as skin colour has been the express basis of advantage and 
disadvantage. South Africans come in all shapes and sizes. The development of an active rather than 
a purely formal sense of enjoying a common citizenship depends on recognising and accepting 
people with all their differences, as they are. The Constitution thus acknowledges the variability of 
human beings …., affirms the right to be different, and celebrates the diversity of the nation. 
Accordingly, what is at stake is not simply a question of removing an injustice experienced by a 
particular section of the community. At issue is a need to affirm the very character of our society as 
one based on tolerance and mutual respect. The test of tolerance is not how one finds space for 
people with whom, and practices with which, one feels comfortable, but how one accommodates the 
expression of what is discomfiting.  
 Minister of Home Affairs v Fourie 2006 1 SA 524 (CC), 2006 3 BCLR 355 (CC) para 61. Prince, Bhe 
and Fourie reflect the tension between the many South African subpublics governed by different 
normative frameworks, and Pharmaceutical Manufacturer's assertion that the Constitution gives all 
normative frameworks their force.  
13  Sunstein One Case at a Time (1996). 
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2.3 The space for cultural autonomy   
In KwaZulu-Natal MEC for Education v Pillay, the Constitutional Court had to decide if a 
Hindu learner was entitled to wear a nose stud to school as an expression of her Tamil 
culture and Hindu religion.14  The school had refused to permit her to wear the stud on 
the grounds that the wearing of the stud did not fall within the core belief set of the 
religion. The Constitutional Court held that the "norm embodied by the Code is not 
neutral, but enforces mainstream and historically privileged forms of adornment, such 
as ear studs which also involve the piercing of a body part, at the expense of minority 
and historically excluded forms". Chief Justice Langa found, in addition, that voluntary 
religious and cultural practices were entitled to the same protection as obligatory 
practices. While recognising the importance of codes of conduct and the need to ensure 
discipline, Chief Justice Langa concluded that a mere appeal to uniformity was 
insufficient grounds to refuse a learner's request for an exemption from a code:   
[I]f there are other learners who hitherto were afraid to express their religions or 
cultures and who will now be encouraged to do so, that is something to be 
celebrated, not feared. As a general rule, the more learners feel free to express their 
religions and cultures in school, the closer we will come to the society envisaged in 
the Constitution. The display of religion and culture in public is not a "parade of 
horribles" but a pageant of diversity which will enrich our schools and in turn our 
country.15 
A school that wishes to enforce a code of conduct under the kind of circumstances that 
brought Ms Pillay to court will have to show that a particular exemption is more likely 
than not to cause a palpable disruption to school activities. Given the absence of any 
such evidence, the Court found that the learner ought to have been granted an 
exemption.16 
                                                          
14  2007 ZACC 21, 2008 1 SA 474 (CC), 2008 2 BCLR 99 (CC).  
15  Id para 107. 
16  In Antonie v Governing Body, Settlers High School, a learner had been found guilty of "serious 
misconduct" for attending school with dreadlocks and a cap she deemed to be essential parts of the 
practice of her Rastafarian faith. 2002 4 SA 738 (C). In the High Court, Van Zyl J held that codes of 
conduct should not be rigidly enforced. They must instead be read in "a spirit of mutual respect, 
reconciliation and tolerance. The mutual respect, in turn, must be directed at understanding and 
protecting, rather than rejecting and infringing, the inherent dignity, convictions and traditions of the 
offender". Id para 17. The student's conduct was ultimately held to fall well short of the definition of 
"serious misconduct", and the High Court set aside the School Governing Body's decision. 
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But what of a school that wishes to order itself and its students along cultural and 
linguistic lines? Here, we have seen the Court offer far less solicitude to single-
medium public schools.  After a long line of High Court cases,17 the Constitutional 
Court in Ermelo makes it clear that considerations of equality and transformation 
will, more often than not, trump considerations of cultural and linguistic solidarity 
asserted by the School Governing Bodies of primary and secondary public schools.  
Put slightly differently, s 29(2) of the Constitution eliminates any "right" to single-
medium public schools, grants the state ultimate authority over language policy and 
makes any demand for single-medium schools subject to threshold tests for equity, 
practicability and historical redress.18 Although Ermelo addresses itself to a mixed 
bag of legal irregularities, opaque statutory provisions and complex constitutional 
issues, it's the Court's commitment to pluralism that animates the  decision to the 
transform a single-medium school into a dual-medium school.19 However, Deputy 
                                                          
17  Matukane v Laerskool Potgietersrus 1996 (3) SA 223 (T); Laerskool Middelburg v Departementshoof, 
Mpumalanga  Departement van Onderwys 2003 4 SA 160 (T); Governing Body, Mikro Primary School 
v Minister of Education, Western Cape 2005 3 SA 504 (C), 2005 2 All SA 37 (C), 2005 10 BCLR 973 
(C); Seodin Primary School v MEC Education, Northern Cape 2006 1 All SA 154 (NC). The Supreme 
Court of Appeal's decision in Mikro must be seen both as an outlier, and overturned as a matter of 
law by Ermelo. 
18  Head of Department, Mpumalanga Department of Education v Hoërskool Ermelo 2010 2 SA 415 
(CC), 2010 3 BCLR 177 (CC).  The Constitutional Court held that the same set of propositions hold 
true for 'right to a basic education' analysis in terms of s 29(1) of the Constitution.  Also see Member 
of the Executive Council for Education in Gauteng Province v Governing Body of the Rivonia Primary 
School 2013 ZACC 34 paras 36, 39, 44, 48, 49: 
 The Schools Act envisages that public schools are run by a three-tier partnership consisting of: (i) 
national government; (ii) provincial government; and (iii) the parents of the learners and the 
members of the community in which the school is located. …[T]he principles that have emerged from 
the case law can be set out as follows: (a) Where the Schools Act empowers a governing body to 
determine policy in relation to a particular aspect of school functioning, a head of department or 
other government functionary cannot simply override the policy adopted or act contrary to it. … But 
this does not mean that the school governing body's powers are unfettered, that the relevant policy 
is immune to intervention, or that the policy inflexibly binds other decision-makers in all 
circumstances. (b) Rather, a functionary may intervene in a school governing body's policy-making 
role or depart from a school governing body's policy, but only where that functionary is entitled to do 
so in terms of powers afforded to it by the Schools Act or other relevant legislation. This is an 
essential element of the rule of law. (c) Where it is necessary for a properly empowered functionary 
to intervene in a policy-making function of the governing body…, then the functionary must act 
reasonably and procedurally fairly. (d) Further, the co-operative governance scheme set out in the 
Constitution … must be directed towards furthering the interests of learners.'   
 See further Head of Department, Department of Education, Free State v Welkom High School 2013 
ZACC 25.  
19  In deciding that the "minority" students must be accommodated, the Laerskool Middelburg court 
correctly concludes that the right to a single-medium public educational institution is clearly 
subordinate to the right which every South African has to education in a similar institution and that 
such institutions might require the sharing of educational facilities by different cultural communities. 
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Chief Justice Moseneke's opinion also makes transparent the Court's lack of 
patience with Hoërskool Ermelo's intransigence with respect to language policy and 
to the admission of black students who wish to be taught in English: 
The case arises in the context of continuing deep inequality in our educational 
system, a painful legacy of our apartheid history. The school system in Ermelo 
illustrates the disparities sharply. The learners-per-class ratios in Ermelo reveal 
startling disparities which point to a vast difference in resources and of the quality of 
education. … [F]ormerly black public schools have been and by and large remain 
scantily resourced. They were deliberately funded stingily by the apartheid 
government. Also, they served in the main and were supported by relatively 
deprived black communities. That is why perhaps the most abiding and debilitating 
legacy of our past is an unequal distribution of skills and competencies acquired 
through education … [FC s 29(2)] is made up of two distinct but mutually reinforcing 
parts. The first part places an obvious premium on receiving education in a public 
school in a language of choice [but] … is available only when it is "reasonably 
practicable". … The second part of s 29(2) of the Constitution protects the right to 
be taught in the language of one's choice. It is an injunction on the State to 
consider all reasonable educational alternatives which are not limited to, but include, 
single-medium institutions. In resorting to an option, such as a single or parallel or 
dual-medium of instruction, the State must take into account what is fair, feasible 
and satisfies the need to remedy the results of past racially discriminatory laws and 
practices.20 
The Ermelo Court does not close the door on public schools that wish to order 
themselves along cultural or linguistic lines.  However, Ermelo makes plain the 
proposition that the form of pluralism to which the basic law commits us is 
fundamentally inconsistent with a school admissions' policy that excludes a 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
The Laerskool Middelburg court seems to be on far shakier grounds when it suggests that a claim to 
a single-medium institution amounts to little more than a desire to maintain a degree of emotional, 
cultural, religious and social-psychological security. This reading trivializes the desire to maintain 
basic, constitutive attachments and the challenge that dual medium schools pose to the maintenance 
of order and discipline between learners (and teachers) from different cultural and linguistic 
communities. It seems clear that the desire to sustain a given culture as it stands is best served by 
single-medium institutions that reinforce implicitly and expressly the importance of sustaining the 
integrity of that community.  Maintaining the integrity of a community has the natural consequence 
of maintaining order through shared mores.  As a result, the Laerskool Middelburg court must be 
wrong when it claims that the conversion of a single-medium public institution to a dual-medium 
school cannot per se diminish the force of each cultural and linguistic community's claim to a school 
organised around its language and culture. That is exactly what the conversion does. Whether such 
insularity is good for learners in an open, multicultural and democratic society committed to equality, 
dignity and freedom is an entirely different matter. See J Jansen Knowledge in the blood: 
Confronting race and the apartheid past (2009).  Jansen is surely correct when he contends that a 
failure to attempt to understand the many communities oppressed by apartheid and colonial rule will 
tend only to replicate the oppression in various spaces and do little to advance our commitment to a 
reasonably egalitarian, pluralist social order.  The doors should be opened even if for no other reason 
than enlightened self-interest.  Success in a multicultural, pluralist society now requires getting along 
and knowing 'the other'.   
20  Ibid at para 58. 
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significant number of students on the basis of culture or language (or race).  Private 
ordering or group rights under our Constitution have discernible limits that flow from 
the commitment to pluralism itself.  
2.4 Language policy in public schools 
The new Curriculum and Assessment Policy Statement [CAPS](First Additional 
Language Policy) and the draft Incremental Implementation of African Language 
(IIAL Policy or Second Additional Language Policy (SAP)) have led to a number of 
disputes over the languages taught in our public schools.21 These recent policies do 
not merely have consequences for elite public schools which have generally chosen 
English and Afrikaans as primary mediums of instruction (Home Language and First 
Additional Language), and a third "African" language as something akin to an extra-
curricular activity.  Prior to the introduction of CAPS, most South African schools 
tended to teach in their learners' home language: that is, in one or two of the nine 
(non-Afrikaans) African languages.22  A small percentage of disadvantaged schools 
shifted to English as the "default" home language and medium of instruction.  In the 
past, most quintile 1 - 3 schools introduced English towards the end of the 
Foundation Phase.  However, many learners in these schools did not acquire 
sufficient vocabulary and reading and writing proficiency to cope with the language 
demands of English medium teaching in Grade 4 (and beyond).23 
                                                          
21  Department of Basic Education (2012) National Curriculum Statement: Curriculum and Assessment 
Policy Statement Foundation Phase R-3. 
22  A growing body of evidence supports the proposition that a significant percentage of learners who 
begin their school careers learning in one of the nine non-Afrikaans African languages is in fact not 
learning in their "mother tongue".  Extant research reveals two permutations of this phenomenon.  
First, a significant portion of African language learners are taught an African language that is not 
spoken at home.  Second, even where learners are, broadly speaking, taught in their home 
language, the African language of instruction often takes the form of a dialect with which they are 
not entirely familiar. For example, many learners speak isiMpondo rather than isiXhosa, or SeSotho-
se-Pretoria rather than SeSotho-se-Lebowa.  See National Education Evaluation and Development 
Unit (2013) National Report 2012.     
23  Aware of this deficit, the Department of Basic Education has shifted the introduction of the first 
additional language to the first year of schooling.  The department reasoned as follows:  
 Children come to school knowing their home language. They can speak it fluently, and already know 
several thousand words. Learning to read and write in Grade 1 builds on this foundation of oral 
language. Therefore, it is easier to learn to read and write in your home language. When children 
start to learn an additional language in Grade 1, they need to build a strong oral foundation. They 
need to hear lots of simple, spoken English which they can understand from the context. Listening to 
the teacher read stories from large illustrated books (Big Books) is a good way of doing this as it also 
supports children's emergent literacy development. As children's understanding grows, they need 
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While CAPS may have been an appropriate curriculum policy decision for most 1 to 3 
quintile schools, it has had unanticipated consequences for a growing number of 
quintile 5 English home language schools.  Over the past fifteen years, privileged 
public schools such as Parkview Junior Primary in Johannesburg and Grove Primary 
School in Cape Town had begun teaching two additional languages in the Foundation 
Phase.  In Johannesburg, the two additional languages tended to be Afrikaans and 
isiZulu.  Western Cape schools were inclined to teach Afrikaans and 
isiXhosa.   Tutelage in these additional languages was initially limited to oral 
instruction.  By Grade 3, schools introduced a limited degree of reading and writing 
tuition.  
A new irony arose.  As a result of the new FAL requirement, a sizeable number of 
English first language schools (a) correctly assumed that they were obliged to make 
a choice as to which two languages required the "Full Monty" in the Foundation 
Phase and (b) opted to drop non-Afrikaans African languages and select Afrikaans as 
the First Additional Language. The choice of Afrikaans as the FAL was, generally, 
based on a range of practical considerations.  First, these schools had Foundation 
Phase teachers that had been trained to teach Afrikaans as a second language.  The 
African language was often taught by a specialist SGB-paid teacher.  Second, the 
adoption of an African language as a FAL – with its additional two to three hours of 
weekly instruction - would have staffing consequences and increase overall school 
expenditure.   As matters stood, these quintile 5 schools already possessed the 
existing resources – books and teachers - to provide instruction in Afrikaans as a 
second language.  Few schools enjoyed comparable resources for African language 
instruction.  Most publishers had never produced systematic materials in African 
languages for the youngest cohort of second language speakers.24   Third, many 
parents expressed anxiety regarding the extremely high demands, and disadvantage, 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
plenty of opportunities to speak the language in simple ways. This provides the foundation for 
learning to read and write in Grades 2 and 3. In South Africa, many children start using their 
additional language, English, as the Language of Learning and Teaching (LoLT) in Grade 4. This 
means that they must reach a high level of competence in English by the end of Grade 3, and they 
need to be able to read and write well in English. For these reasons, their progress in literacy must 
be accelerated in Grades 2 and 3. Id. 
24  Koornhof From conception to consumption: An examination of the intellectual process of producing 
textbooks for foundation phase education in South Africa PhD, University of the Witwatersrand 
(2012). 
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which IsiZulu and other African language matriculation examinations would place 
upon their children. Even exceptional African language students often performed 
poorly. Afrikaans, by contrast, was widely viewed as an "easy" language that offered 
the opportunity for excellent matric results.  For learners in elite public schools 
competing for a limited number of places in first rate university programmes, a 
mediocre FAL mark could well prejudice their chances.  Given the "locked-in" 
systemic advantages of tuition in English and Afrikaans, the SGBs of many top 
quintile schools chose Afrikaans as the FAL and dropped African language instruction.  
The irony of which Deputy Chief Justice spoke is no longer collateral.25  Diminished 
African language instruction, in a growing cohort of schools, is a direct function of 
the absence of adequate teaching materials, qualified teachers, additional expenses, 
ostensibly difficult matric exams, and the lock-in of English and Afrikaans as 
dominant languages of instruction.26  
Both the Ermelo Court and the national government have made it clear that the 9 
official African languages ought to be treated with the same degree of respect 
accorded Afrikaans and English.27  For sound pedagogical reasons, they want to 
ensure that home language instruction and second language tuition are offered from 
initial entrance into our primary schools.  Moreover, both the Ermelo Court and the 
national government have recognised that schools not only have an obligation to 
provide what learners believe to be appropriate and desired instruction in the 
languages of their choice, but they also have an obligation to prepare learners, 
through language instruction, with the capacity to engage various members of South 
Africa's pluralist polity -- who do not share their home language -- in a respectful and 
dignified fashion.  However, the problem identified above with respect to the space 
schools are granted for maintaining a balance between institutional order and 
cultural autonomy is replicated here.  To ensure sufficient order so that effective 
learning can take place, the state and all other concerned parties must guarantee the 
                                                          
25  Smit "Collateral irony" and "insular construction": Justifying single medium schools, equal access and 
quality education' (2011) 27 South African Journal on Human Rights 398.   
26  It is accurate to say that (a) almost all former Model C schools in Gauteng (including schools with a 
majority of black learners), and (b) virtually all schools in Gauteng with English, Afrikaans, Indian 
and Coloured learner majorities have opted for Afrikaans and English language instruction. The 
LOLTS survey is but one public source of this data. 
27  Woolman & Fleisch "The Problem of the 'Other' Language" (2014) 5 Constitutional Court Review 183. 
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availability of appropriately trained teachers and administrators, as well as the 
adequacy of existing textbooks, across all 11 languages.  The new policies recognise 
cognisable, constitutionally-recognised limits on each school's capacity to deliver 
immediately upon this laudable goal and commitment to pluralism.    
2.5 Private ordering and public schools 
The constitutional matter in Governing Body of the Juma Musjid Primary School v 
Ahmed Asruff Essay arose out of a dispute between the Juma Musjid Trust (Trust), 
the owner of the private property, the Member of the Executive Council for Education 
for KwaZulu-Natal (MEC), the School Governing Body (SGB) for Juma Musjid Primary 
School, and the learners and parents at the school.28 The trust, a private entity, had 
for some time leased the land to the government. The government had, in turn, used 
the property for maintaining a primary school. The dispute arose when the Trust and 
the MEC of Education for KwaZulu-Natal could not conclude an agreement under the 
South African Schools Act regarding continued tenancy by the province and the 
school. The Trust then secured an eviction order in the High Court. The Supreme 
Court of Appeal upheld the order. Unlike the courts below, the Constitutional Court 
was not so ready to allow private interests to trump public interests. The Court 
framed the discussions to be had by all the concerned parties within the following 
normative rubric. First, the Trustees had a negative duty in terms of s 8(2) and s 
29(1) of the Constitution not to infringe the right of the learners to access to a basic 
education. Second, while the trustees had acted reasonably in approaching the High 
Court for an eviction order, its behaviour did not constitute sufficient reason for the 
High Court to grant the eviction order under the circumstances.  The trustees and 
the High Court had failed to consider properly the best interests of the learners and 
their right to a basic education.  Third, the MEC had a positive obligation to provide 
access to schools in line with the learners' right to a basic education, and had thus 
far failed to discharge that duty. Fourth, if meaningful engagement between the 
parties failed, then the MEC was obliged to take steps to secure alternative 
placements for the learners. In addition, the MEC was required to file a report setting 
                                                          
28  Governing Body of the Juma Musjid Primary School & Others v Ahmed Asruff Essay NO & Others 
[2011] ZACC 13, 2011 (8) BCLR 761 (CC). 
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out, among other things, the steps that she had taken to ensure that the learners' 
right to a basic education had been secured.  The Constitutional Court asked the 
parties to reach a normatively satisfying and Pareto-optimal settlement in light of the 
Court's gloss on the constitutional rights and common-law obligations of the parties.   
The parties could not meet the Court's desiderata.  The result, in the end, was 
castigation of each and every party to the dispute (save for the learners) and a court 
order that tracked the content of the original meaningful engagement order (as 
delineated above).29  
For my purposes, the most compelling feature of the judgment is the Court's 
recognition that private actors have predominantly negative obligations regarding the 
basic education of learners at primary and secondary public schools.  The Juma 
Musjid Court's path-breaking finding is that a private party – the Trust – clearly had a 
negative duty in terms of s 29(1) of the Constitution not to impair the access of 
learners to public schools.  How this judgment serves the ends of pluralism requires 
some teasing out.   
The private trust was clearly interested in using the land and the school for sectarian 
purposes. That is, they wished to take the school out of the orbit of the public school 
system.  Juma Musjid thus offers rather penetrating insight as to (a) how private 
parties will be treated with respect to their contributions to, or their interference 
with, learners' rights to a basic education; (b) the extent to which private parties 
may use their wealth and their power to determine the ethical and cultural ethos of a 
school; and (c) the circumstances in which the constitutional commitment to 
pluralism trumps sectarian interests.   
The Juma Musjid Court clearly echoes the Gauteng School Education Bill Court's 
distinction between the pursuit of a specific religious, cultural or linguistic ethos in 
public schools and in private schools.  The Constitutional Court – in both cases – 
                                                          
29  For a rather optimistic account of the trajectory of the Court's meaningful engagement jurisprudence, 
see Woolman The Selfless Constitution: Experimentation and Flourishing as Foundations of South 
Africa's Basic Law (2013). For a more sceptical reading, see McLean 'Meaningful engagement: One 
step forward or two steps back? Some thoughts on Joe Slovo' (2011) 3 Constitutional Court Review 
223. 
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limits the degree to which public schools can be used to advance the religious, 
cultural or linguistic interests of learners from one subpublic at the expense of 
learners from another subpublic.  Private religious, cultural or language based 
schools retain a significant degree of space within which to create a room of and for 
their own. 
Juma Musjid also resonates profoundly with debate surrounding school fees (a 
matter that has never reached the Constitutional Court because of legislative 
interventions.)30 Despite cries for a no-fee education system across the board, the 
state correctly disaggregated Quintile 1 schools through Quintile 3 schools from 
Quintile 4 and Quintile 5 schools.  By allowing the two highest quintiles to continue to 
charge fees, the state clearly acknowledged that private parties – whether natural 
persons or juristic persons – could substantially alter the form and the substance of 
an individual school through their contributions to its purse. It's fair to say that the 
Constitution contemplates this arrangement by not requiring basic education to be 
free under s 29(1) of the Constitution: -- thereby encouraging various religious, 
cultural and linguistic groups to seek accommodation within public schools in terms 
of s 29(2) of the Constitution.   
If we are to take seriously the horizontal application of s 29(1) to private parties, as 
well as the Constitution's commitment to pluralism, then we must contemplate the 
possibility that the contributions and therefore the influence of natural persons or 
juristic persons over the manner in which a school is ordered will be subject to an 
obligation not to interfere with the rights of learners to a basic education.  So, for 
example, if a large number of isiZulu-speaking parents, or an organisation devoted to 
the promotion of Zulu culture, made significant contributions by way of the lease of 
private property or donations of increased fees to a given school so that both the 
language and the culture would be given prominence of place, the learning from 
Juma Musjid (and Ermelo) is that such a school could not negatively interfere with 
rights of a significant cohort of other learners to be admitted to the school or to 
receive tuition in their first language of choice.  Once again: the Court has quietly 
                                                          
30  Woolman & Fleisch "On the constitutionality of school fees: A reply to Roithmayr" (2004) 
Perspectives in Education 111 - 123. 
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reached into the internal affairs of individual public schools and found that sectarian 
interests cannot ride roughshod over the commitment to pluralism reflected in the 
Constitution.  And again: the partition between what private parties may do in public 
schools and what they may do in private schools is on all fours with the holding in 
Gauteng School Education Bill.  If parents wish to have the internal affairs of a school 
strictly governed by the dictates of a particular religion, the practices of a specific 
culture, or the tuition in a specific language, then they are free to do so in terms of s 
29(3) of the Constitution and through the formation of an independent school (that 
still may not discriminate on racial grounds).  
3  Pluralism and order in our public schools 
3.1  Habermas and the golden thread 
What exactly does Habermas mean when he states that "[t]he development of 
constitutional democracy along the celebrated 'North Atlantic' path has certainly 
provided us with results worth preserving, but once those who do not have the good 
fortune to be the heirs of the Founding Fathers turn to their own traditions, they 
cannot find criteria and reasons that would allow them to distinguish what would be 
worth preserving from what should be rejected"? He means that the constitutions 
(written and unwritten) of older, well-established democracies are grounded in 
traditions that can readily identify the normative content that ought to fill out the 
basic law.  Every reader knows that the constitutional democracies of the celebrated 
"North Atlantic" to which Habermas refers in 1996 encompassed no more than a 
fistful of nations.  His worry and his focus then shifts to those nations that, after the 
fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, felt themselves obliged to reconstruct themselves, at 
least formally, along the lines and through documents that parroted the language of 
celebrated "North Atlantic" constitutions and of covenants generated by the United 
Nations.  In these new constitutional orders, the basic law came not from the ground 
up (as a reflection of shared political, social, cultural, religious and economic 
traditions) but from the top down.  These new Constitutions were largely drawn up 
by sophisticated (legally-trained) elites (and a large number of foreign experts) 
whose immediate concerns were not an adequate reflection of the multiplicity of 
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traditions and communities that made up the polity.  For these more traditional 
associations, communities, bonding networks and subpublics, the new constitution 
was just another illegitimate imposition – albeit something of an improvement upon 
the authoritarian, communist or racist regimes from which they had been liberated.  
In this regard, Habermas was a decade (or two) ahead of comparative constitutional 
law scholars cum political scientists who (suddenly) have discovered that a large 
portion of the post-1989 constitutional democracies have become one-party 
dominant democracies plagued by the three Cs of cronyism, clientelism and 
corruption.31   
Habermas' prescience lay in two critical insights into the celebrated "North Atlantic" 
constitutional democracies and the new constitutional democracies arriving on the 
scene as he began this seminal work in the late 1980s.  First, constitutions are 
scaffolding: they require social, cultural and economic arrangements within which the 
hurly-burly of politics can be worked out in a manner that satisfies the demands for 
meaningful collective action. Second, to be successful, constitutional democracies 
require: (a) a robust civil society which not only mediates vertical relationships 
between citizen and state, but also facilitates, negotiates and resolves horizontal 
relationships between citizens, and between the various associations that provide the 
setting for the lion's share of meaningful action undertaken by individuals within the 
polity itself;32 (b) a commitment to the rule of law that, at a minimum, ensures that 
the governed and the governors are subject to the same legal strictures, and 
                                                          
31  Choudhry '"He had a Mandate": The South African Constitutional Court and the African National 
Congress in a dominant party democracy' (2009) 2 Constitutional Court Review 1; Choudhry 
Constitutional design for divided societies: Integration or accommodation (2008); Roux "The 
South African Constitutional Court's democratic rights jurisprudence" (2014) 5 Constitutional 
Court Review 33; Roux The politics of principle: The first South African Constitutional Court, 1995 
- 2005 (2013); Roux "Principle and pragmatism on the Constitutional Court of South Africa" 
(2009) 7 International Journal of Constitutional Law 106; Issacharoff "Constitutional Courts and 
Democratic Hedging" (2012) 99 Georgetown Law Journal 961; S Issacharoff "Constitutionalizing 
democracy in fractured societies" (2004) 82 Texas Law Review 1861; Issacharoff "The 
democratic risk to democratic transitions" (2014) 5 Constitutional Court Review 1;  Dixon & 
Ginsburg "The South African Constitutional Court and socio-economic rights as insurance swaps" 
(2012) 4 Constitutional Court Review 1; Klug "Finding The Constitutional Court's place in South 
Africa's democracy: The interaction of principle and institutional pragmatism in the court's 
decision-making" (2010) 3 Constitutional Court Review 1; Klug The Constitution of South Africa: 
A Contextual Analysis (2010).  
32  Krygier "The quality of civility: Post-Anti-Communist thoughts on civil society and the rule of law" 
in Sajó (ed) Out of and into authoritarian law (2002) 55. 
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ultimately (c) a commitment to the rule of law that maximally enhances the mutual 
concern, respect and trust that individuals (and groups) have for one another and 
which enables them to cooperate in a manner that does not require coercion by the 
state in order to produce public goods on scale.33   
With respect to the first insight, the South African Constitutional Court quickly 
recognised that its role was to provide "scaffolding".  Such is the learning of the First 
Certification Judgment.34  What the Constitutional Court could not do, and no apex 
court ever does do, was to recast the socio-economic environment that it had 
inherited in a manner that generated (rather immediately) the social democratic 
outcomes (or at least the liberal democratic outcomes) identified with its celebrated 
predecessors.  One does not jump from an oppressive political order with the world's 
highest Gini-coefficient to a social democracy simply by having one of the most 
cleverly designed constitutions in history.  With respect to the second insight, the 
Court did what it could.  It placed at the centre of its project the (a) creation of a 
rule of law culture; (b) the promotion of individual rights that quite often led to the 
reversal of colonial and apartheid-era rules of law; (c) enhanced roles for public 
participation in the legislative process and (d) greater insulation from political 
interference for the Office of the Public Protector, the Auditor-General, and to 
whatever other 'independent' investigatory unit is charged with rooting out 
corruption.35   
The Constitutional Court also recognised something critical for our nascent 
constitutional democratic project. It shares Habermas' insight that the radical 
heterogeneity of the communities, subpublics, cultural networks and associations 
that fall with South Africa's sovereign borders (and likewise reflect our oppressive 
history of so-called separate development) leave the Court in a position where it 
cannot easily draw down on any one tradition to decide what aspects of our society 
we should preserve and what aspects of our society we should discard.  Until such 
                                                          
33  Olson The logic of collective action: Public goods and the theory of groups (1965). 
34  Ex Parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: In Re Certification of the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa, 1996 1996 4 SA 744 (CC), 1996 10 BCLR 1253 (CC).  
35  Glenister v President of the Republic of South Africa. 2011 ZACC 6, 2011 3 SA 347 (CC), 2011 7 
BCLR 651 (CC). 
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time that we can adequately stitch together our component parts, a commitment to 
pluralism – political, legal, social, religious, cultural and linguistic – remains the most 
defensible justification available to the Court in the kinds of cases canvassed herein.  
3.2  The golden thread of pluralism in the Constitutional Court's 
education jurisprudence  
The recognition of pluralism - the unavoidability of pluralism – is the Court's golden 
thematic thread.  It runs through cases as "diverse" as Prince, Bhe and Fourie.  It 
explains our modest body of education jurisprudence, and, consequently, the manner 
in which schools may order their admissions policies, curriculum and other internal 
affairs, whilst adequately recognising learners' rights. Pluralism underwrites Justice 
Kriegler's assessment – in Gauteng Education Bill - of the limits placed upon what a 
public school may do with regard to a learner's rights to religion, culture and 
language and the greater degree of latitude afforded independent schools with 
regard to such matters.  Pluralism grounds Justice Sach's distinction – in Christian 
Education - between the form of discipline that may be used by a teacher upon a 
learner in a "public" setting (irrespective of the religious tenets by which the school 
abides) and the form of chastisement that parents may employ at home (in a 
manner consistent with the strictures of their religious faith.) Pluralism does virtually 
all the heavy lifting in Justice Langa's opinion in Pillay. It places the burden on school 
officials to demonstrate why the granting of an exemption to a learner regarding 
religious or cultural dress should be subordinate to a disciplinary code that governs 
the garb worn by other learners within a school. Pluralism provides the foundations 
for Justice Moseneke's dual contention – in Ermelo -- that (a) language policies 
cannot be used to bar from admission a significant cohort of learners who seek 
tuition in a language of their choice and (b) language policies, going forward, must 
take into account the equal standing of all 11 official languages and provide the 
curriculum and the resources necessary for speakers of these 11 official languages to 
meet one another as equals in the public square.  Consistent with Justice Moseneke's 
findings in Ermelo, pluralism provides the justification for the state's First Additional 
Language Policy and the Incremental Implementation of African Languages Policy.  
Pluralism lies at the core of Justice Cameron's argument – in Juma Musjid -- that a 
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learner's right to a basic education cannot be undermined by a private party's desire 
to advance the narrow, sectarian interests of a given religious community. 
3.3  The effect of pluralism on membership and governance in public 
schools 
Taken as a whole, what effect does the Court's commitment to pluralism in its 
education judgments have on the manner in which our classrooms are constructed?  
In the absence of a single tradition from which learners' rights can be drawn, the 
Constitutional Court has adopted an "open the door" approach.  Learners who wish 
to receive tuition in an official language of their choice must, where it is reasonably 
practicable to do so, be accommodated.  Nor are the majority of learners denied the 
right to receive tuition in their preferred tongue.  Of course, this "open the door" 
approach places additional burdens on school officials. They must learn to 
accommodate "differences" – especially differences that have long been repressed.  
They must enable learners from a multiplicity of traditions to live with and study with 
one another.  In a nation long governed by apartness, this golden thread of pluralism 
provides us with an opportunity to do things differently – whether in terms of tuition 
in a language other than Afrikaans or English, or preventing private parties from 
using state run schools to advance sectarian interests.  The Court is simply opening 
the door to learners for whom the door has historically been closed. 
Will white kids continue to sit with white kids, black kids with black kids, and Indian 
kids with Indian kids?  Of course.  Pluralism accommodates cliques.  We find comfort 
in what's common.  We seek out succour and solace in what might appear to be a 
dull sameness. Nowhere, whether in Habermas' Between Facts and Norms, in Judt's 
ruminations on Belgium, or in the learning to be had from our Constitutional Court, 
does it say we must all be friends.  The Court's commitment to pluralism simply 
opens public school doors to all learners.  The burden that falls on school governing 
bodies, principals, teachers and other schools officials is to keep them open and 
create something greater than the sum of the parts of our radically heterogeneous 
South Africa. 
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